AI infrastructure backlog and RPO tracker
Everyone tracks how much the hyperscalers are spending. What those companies have already sold gets far less attention. This page collects every disclosed backlog and remaining performance obligation figure across the AI buildout, from the cloud platforms down to the people making switchgear, and says what each number counts and where the company disclosed it. Figures move only when a company reports, so this updates each earnings season rather than live.
Updated · figures move only when a company reports
How much each number is worth
The gap between a figure in an audited filing and a figure on a slide can be large. Core Scientific states more than $24B of potential contracted revenue while its own quarterly report shows about $9.2B of contracted lease payments. Both are on this page, labelled differently.
Who has sold the compute
Cloud platforms and AI specialists, ranked by what customers have contractually committed to pay them. This is the closest thing to a direct measure of booked AI demand.
| Company | Backlog / RPO | QoQ | Basis | What the number counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Microsoft MSFT | $678B | +8.1% | Filed | Commercial remaining performance obligations |
Year on year +84.2%. Microsoft reports two figures. Commercial RPO is $678B; total company RPO is $684B. Weighted average duration about 2.3 years, with roughly 30% expected to be recognized within twelve months. | ||||
Oracle ORCL | $638B | +15.5% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations |
Year on year +362.3%. Company-wide, not cloud only, and the longest-dated book on this page. Only about 12% is expected to convert to revenue within twelve months. Oracle also disclosed that $75B of the large AI contracts is prepaid GPU or customer-supplied hardware rather than recurring cloud. | ||||
Alphabet GOOGL | $520B | +11.1% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations (revenue backlog) |
Alphabet changed the definition in Q1 2026 to also include contracts with an original expected term of a year or less. The year-ago $108.2B excluded those, so the year-over-year comparison is invalid and only the sequential move is clean. Google Cloud accounts for $513.9B of the total. Just over 50% is expected within 24 months. | ||||
Amazon AMZN | $496B | +36.3% | Filed | Performance obligations on contracts with original terms over one year |
Year on year +154.4%. Amazon deliberately avoids the phrase remaining performance obligations. The figure covers only contracts with original terms longer than a year, so it understates total commitments. Weighted average remaining life stretched to 6.4 years from 4.0 a year earlier. The filing names the drivers: a $100B eight-year OpenAI expansion on top of an existing $38B, and a $100B-plus ten-year Anthropic expansion. | ||||
CoreWeave CRWV | $104B3.7 GW contracted at quarter end | +4.8% | Filed | Revenue backlog (RPO plus other committed contract revenue) |
Year on year +246.2%. Made up of $103.7B RPO plus $0.5B other committed revenue. Lifetime of contract, not annual: 41% is expected in the first 24 months. The figure excludes more than $25B of new commitments added in early Q3, which is why some outlets are running a $129B headline. That sum is a media construction, not a CoreWeave disclosure. Contracted power was 4.2 GW as of Aug 11, against 3.7 GW at quarter end. | ||||
IBM IBM | $68B | -1.4% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations |
Year on year +3.0%. The control group for this whole page. IBM's RPO has gone $66B to $69B to $68B over four quarters while the hyperscalers roughly doubled. It excludes contracts a customer can terminate for convenience without substantive penalty, so it understates IBM's book. A separate IBM Consulting backlog of $30.8B is reported on a basis IBM notes has no third-party standard. | ||||
Nebius Group NBIS | $37B5 GW contracted power targeted for year-end 2026 | +11.6% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations |
Excludes performance obligations with an original duration of a year or less. About 36% is recognizable within 24 months. Annualized run-rate revenue reached $3.0B in June, up from $1.9B in March, but run-rate is not contracted value. The 5 GW is a year-end target, not a current contracted figure. | ||||
Applied Digital APLD | $36B1,410 MW contracted critical IT load | +133.2% | Stated | Total contracted revenue over initial 15-year base terms |
Year on year +417.1%. Definitive take-or-pay leases, not letters of intent, and non-cancellable such that termination for convenience requires the full remaining contract value. The widely quoted $86B assumes every renewal option is exercised and should not be used as backlog. Delta Forge 2 was signed after the May 31 year end, so strictly as of the balance sheet date the executed book was about 1,200 MW and $31B. Only around 100 MW was revenue-generating. | ||||
Galaxy Digital GLXY | $30B526 MW contracted critical IT load | — | Stated | Total potential contract value including extension options |
The $30B assumes two five-year extensions beyond the initial 15-year term and includes annual escalators. The 15-year base alone is roughly $18B. All 526 MW are executed leases rather than options, but the tenant is CoreWeave, so this is a neocloud counterparty rather than a hyperscaler. A further 830 MW at Helios remains uncontracted. | ||||
Hut 8 HUT | $27B949 MW contracted IT capacity | — | Stated | Aggregate base-term contract value across AI data center leases |
Three 15-year leases: 245 MW at River Bend with Fluidstack, about $7.0B, and two 352 MW leases at Beacon Point with an unnamed high-investment-grade tenant, about $9.8B each. The second Beacon Point lease was signed after quarter end, so strictly as of June 30 the executed book was about $16.8B. Base term only, on triple-net, take-or-pay terms with more than $1.75B of expected average annual NOI. The release says renewal options lift potential campus-level value to $50.2B; that is an options figure and should not be used as backlog. | ||||
Core Scientific CORZ | $24B1.1 GW claimed, 590 MW leased per the 10-Q | — | Stated | Potential contracted revenue |
The widest gap on this page between the press number and the accounts. The 10-Q shows $6.09B of future operating lease payments expected to be received plus $3.1B on leases not yet commenced, about $9.2B against a stated $24B. The word used is potential. Leased capacity in the 10-Q table is flat at 590 MW for three straight quarters; the 1.1 GW adds roughly 530 MW from the AMD agreement signed after quarter end. The CoreWeave takeover was voted down and terminated in October 2025. | ||||
TeraWulf WULF | $19BAbout 401 MW critical IT load | — | Stated | Contracted revenue over the 20-year initial lease term |
TeraWulf publishes no consolidated backlog or RPO at all; this is a single lease. The Anthropic agreement was signed July 6, 2026, after quarter end. The $19B is the 20-year base term, implying roughly $950M a year. The $33B figure that appears in some coverage assumes both five-year extension options are exercised. | ||||
Cipher Mining CIFR | $11B700 MW contracted gross HPC capacity | 0.0% | Stated | Contracted revenue over 10 to 15 year base lease terms |
The figure appears only in the slide deck. The quarterly press release and the 10-Q contain no backlog, RPO or contracted-revenue disclosure. Because the HPC contracts are accounted for as leases rather than revenue contracts, no GAAP RPO exists. Base term only, with extension options excluded. Flat quarter over quarter. Note this is gross HPC capacity, a different denominator from the critical IT load figures other companies report. The registrant renamed from Cipher Mining in February 2026. | ||||
Riot Platforms RIOT | $9.8B241 MW contracted critical IT capacity | — | Stated | Contracted data center lease revenue over initial terms |
Two tenants at the Rockdale, Texas campus. The headline deal is a 20-year, 191 MW lease signed after quarter end with what Riot calls one of the world's leading frontier AI labs, about $9.1B over the initial term; Bloomberg reported the tenant is Anthropic, but Riot has not named it. Two five-year extension options take potential value to about $16.1B per the release. Some outlets ran $16.5B, which matches nothing in the filing. The remainder is the AMD lease from January 2026, 50 MW when fully deployed, about $0.7B by subtraction since Riot has not broken it out. | ||||
CleanSpark CLSK | $6.6B175 MW critical IT load | — | Stated | Contracted revenue over the initial 20-year lease term |
First HPC deal: a 20-year triple-net lease at Sandersville, Georgia with an unnamed high-investment-grade global technology company. Deliveries begin in Q4 2027, with average annual NOI of about $330M at a nearly 100% margin. The $11.6B ceiling assumes both five-year extension options are exercised and should not be used as backlog. The tenant also signed a letter of intent and exclusivity covering CleanSpark's entire 885 MW Texas portfolio; an LOI is not a contract and carries no dollar value. Mining is still nearly all of current revenue. | ||||
Bitdeer BTDR | $4.7B121 MW contracted critical IT load | — | Stated | Contracted revenue over the initial 16-year lease term |
Colocation lease at the Tydal, Norway campus with Volta Tydal AS; the end customer is described only as a leading AI lab, with Dell as technology provider. Priced at about $202 per kW-month with 3% annual escalators. An eight-year renewal option takes potential value to about $8.0B over 24 years; the base term is the comparable figure. The dollar figures appear in the press release only; the 6-K exhibit filed with the SEC announces the lease without them. | ||||
SharonAI Holdings SHAZ | $2.6B116 MW contracted of 132 MW planned | +100.0% | Stated | Announced AI cloud contract value, aggregate |
Sum of three separately disclosed five-year cloud agreements, each with a different unnamed counterparty: about $950M with a global technology company served from NEXTDC data centers in Australia (May, first deployment accepted in August), $1.32B with a global AI lab served from New Zealand (July; the MW figure on this row refers to this deal), and $373M with a global AI platform, also Australia (August, revenue from Q1 2027). Read with caution: the company reported about $294k of revenue in Q1 2026, so the combined book is thousands of times current quarterly revenue, and none of it appears in the financial statements. The separate NVIDIA arrangement for up to 40,000 GB300 GPUs is a revenue-sharing partnership with no stated contract value. Recently listed small cap. | ||||
WhiteFiber WYFI | $1.0B | — | Filed | Remaining performance obligations |
The spinoff from Bit Digital listed in 2025, and the only miner-adjacent name in this group with a filed RPO. Mostly long-term colocation contracts anchored by the NC-1 campus agreement, described on the call as about $865M over ten years. Cloud agreements announced after the quarter closed, more than $540M in aggregate contract value including Base 10 at $165M and Prime Intellect at $108M, are not yet in the RPO. | ||||
IREN IREN | $710M | +145.7% | Filed | Unsatisfied remaining performance obligations |
Do not read this as a small book of business. IREN includes amounts in RPO only for tranches that have been delivered and accepted, and as of the reporting date there had been none. The roughly $9.7B Microsoft agreement therefore contributed zero. IREN said on Aug 13, 2026 that the first Horizon deployment had been delivered to and accepted by Microsoft, so this figure should step up materially. IREN has not yet reported its June year end. | ||||
HIVE Digital Technologies HIVE | $600M | +140.0% | Stated | Announced AI cloud contract value, aggregate |
Sum of three disclosures by its BUZZ HPC unit: a five-year, roughly $350M AI cloud services agreement with an unnamed investment-grade enterprise customer announced Aug 17, a three-year, $220M GPU cloud contract with Bell Canada serving Cohere closed in June, plus about $30M of two-year AI cloud contracts from February. HIVE frames its own progress in ARR terms, about $180M annualized once contracted capacity comes online, not as backlog, so this row is an aggregation rather than a company-stated total. | ||||
Crusoe Private | —4.9 GW contracted | — | Stated | Contracted AI infrastructure capacity |
Private, with no registration statement on file, so there is no audited comparison. Crusoe has never published a dollar backlog. The 40 GW figure that circulates is a development pipeline including sites still under tenant negotiation, not contracted capacity. The $15B Abilene number is a joint-venture funding commitment, not customer contract value. | ||||
Keel Infrastructure KEEL | Not disclosed2.2 GW pipeline | — | None | No signed lease yet |
The former Bitfarms, mid-pivot with nothing signed yet, which is exactly why it is on this page. Keel exited bitcoin mining (Moses Lake mining shut in April 2026), raised $458 million in convertible notes for $819 million of liquidity, and is targeting lease execution in 2026 at three sites: Panther Creek in Pennsylvania (the 350 MW flagship under a grid agreement with PPL, where management says larger AI companies lead engagement), Sharon in Pennsylvania (a 110 MW phase under evaluation), and Moses Lake in Washington (18 MW, expected to be its first data center online in 2027). Until a lease is executed there is no backlog to record, and this row exists to say so. | ||||
Lambda Private | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
No public disclosureNo filing Private, no registration statement on file. Its Microsoft agreement is described only as multibillion-dollar and multi-year with no figure attached, and a May 2026 credit facility release references a contracted revenue base without quantifying it. Revenue and valuation numbers circulating online come from third-party pre-IPO marketing estimates, not from Lambda. | ||||
MARA Holdings MARA | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
One of the largest public miners is pivoting hard, with a power portfolio targeted at 4.8 GW, the about $1.5B Long Ridge gas plant acquisition in Ohio, a Starwood joint venture and a majority stake in EDF's Exaion, but it has signed no AI lease and discloses no contracted revenue figure. The Q2 shareholder letter does not contain the words backlog, contract value or contracted at all. Long Ridge's about $144M of annualized EBITDA described as 70% contracted is power sales, not AI backlog. | ||||
Meta Platforms META | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
This is a policy, not a research gap. Neither the Q2 2026 10-Q nor the FY2025 10-K contains a single instance of remaining performance obligation or backlog as a disclosed figure. Meta's advertising revenue is short cycle and it elects the practical expedient for contracts of a year or less, so no comparable metric exists. It should not be constructed. | ||||
Who owns the buildings
Data center landlords, kept separate because their metric runs on a different clock. A REIT backlog is stated as annualized rent, meaning revenue per year once the lease switches on, while almost every other figure on this page is a lifetime-of-contract total. The two must never be ranked against each other.
| Company | Backlog / RPO | QoQ | Basis | What the number counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Equinix EQIX | $15B | +5.6% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations |
Year on year +23.0%. Equinix announces a record backlog in its results and then never puts a number on it anywhere, so this GAAP obligation is the only quantified figure available. It is not a backlog of undelivered capacity: most of it is contracted revenue on space already built and billing, making it a revenue-visibility measure. Roughly 65% is expected within two years. It also understates total economics, because it excludes metered power, certain xScale fees and any contract terminable without significant penalty, which covers most interconnection revenue. One trap to avoid: the 10-Q shows $708M of leases not yet commenced, but that is Equinix as a tenant on its own ground and space leases, a liability rather than customer demand. | ||||
Digital Realty DLR | $1.9B a year1,402 MW under construction, 54% leased | +5.6% | Stated | Backlog of signed-but-not-commenced leases, stated as annualized GAAP base rent |
Read the unit before comparing this to anything else on the page: it is rent per year once the leases commence, not a lifetime contract total. Figures are at 100% share; at Digital Realty's own share the backlog is $1.4B against $826M a year earlier, up 69%, and that is the only clean year-over-year basis. The reason the backlog is swelling is worth watching: the average lag between signing and commencement stretched to nine months this quarter from four a year ago. Two hyperscale leases signed in July, worth $410M of annualized rent at 100% share, sit outside this figure. | ||||
Iron Mountain IRM | $370M110 MW leased year to date through July | — | Stated | Data center backlog, stated as revenue growth supported beyond 2026 |
Not comparable to the other landlord rows. Digital Realty states signed-but-not-commenced leases as annualized rent; Iron Mountain instead says its current data center backlog supports an additional $370M of revenue growth beyond 2026, and that is before 75 MW of leases signed in July in Mumbai and London with hyperscalers. Year-to-date leasing of 110 MW through July had already passed the original full-year target. No total contract value is published. | ||||
Who supplies the power and cooling
Turbines, switchgear, grid equipment and thermal management. Read these with care: they are company-wide backlogs in which AI is one customer among many, and none of these firms breaks out a data-center figure.
| Company | Backlog / RPO | QoQ | Basis | What the number counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Siemens Energy ENR.DE | $187B | — | Stated | Order backlog |
Year on year +19.1%. Reported as EUR 162bn and converted here at 1.1534, so treat the dollar figure as indicative rather than exact. Company-wide and mostly not AI related: Gas Services is about EUR 73bn and Grid Technologies about EUR 51bn. One trap worth naming, the EUR 26bn increase widely reported is the year-over-year change, not a sequential jump. | ||||
GE Vernova GEV | $176BGas Power equipment backlog 53 GW, plus 63 GW of slot reservations | +8.0% | Filed | Total backlog (remaining performance obligations) |
Year on year +37.0%. Only part of this is a data-center story. The total splits into $87.8B of equipment and $88.5B of services, and the services book runs ten to fifteen years on gas and wind agreements that have nothing to do with AI. The Power segment is $111.6B of the total. Gas Power equipment backlog is disclosed only in gigawatts, with no dollar figure. Electrification equipment backlog is $40.6B, up 69% year over year. | ||||
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries MHVYF | $89B35 GW large-frame gas turbine backlog | — | Stated | Company-wide order backlog |
14,103 billion yen converted per the fx note, and like Caterpillar it is mostly not AI: the total spans aerospace, defense and logistics. The AI-relevant slice is gas turbines, where the large-frame backlog reached 35 GW against 23 GW a year earlier and Energy Systems order intake rose 56% in the quarter, attributed by the CFO to core US utility customers. MHI publishes no dollar backlog for the energy unit alone. | ||||
Caterpillar CAT | $72BAbout $29.2B not expected to fill within 12 months | +15.0% | Filed | Backlog believed to be firm |
Year on year +92.3%. The largest backlog on this page outside the hyperscalers, and it nearly doubled in a year, from $37.5B to $72.1B. But almost none of it is identifiably AI. Caterpillar publishes no segment dollar breakdown and no data-center backlog, and the total spans excavators and dealer fleet, mining trucks, oil and gas compression, marine and rail. Data centers are a subset of a subset. What the filing does say is that the largest increase came in Power and Energy, the segment renamed from Energy and Transportation this year, and that power generation grew on large engines and turbines primarily in data center applications. Note the $72.1B appears only in the 10-Q; the earnings release says merely a growing backlog. | ||||
Hitachi (Energy segment) HTHIY | $64B | — | Stated | Hitachi Energy order backlog |
The backlog of the Hitachi Energy business inside Hitachi Ltd, stated at $63.6B (about 10.3 trillion yen), up 10% in dollar terms after Energy orders jumped 87% on large European HVDC awards. Grid equipment, transformers and HVDC are the AI tie, with data centers one driver among several. A segment figure of the parent, which trades OTC as HTHIY. | ||||
ABB ABBNY | $30B | — | Stated | Order backlog |
Up 28% year over year on record quarterly orders of $12.0B. Electrification orders rose 58% with data center orders growing triple digits, which is the AI tie; the backlog itself is company-wide and includes robotics, motion and process automation. ABB left the NYSE in 2023 and trades OTC as ABBNY. | ||||
Eaton ETN | $24B | +5.7% | Filed | Total backlog of firm orders |
Year on year +37.7%. Company-wide with no data-center carve-out at all. Electrical Americas is $15.2B and Electrical Global $3.6B, while Aerospace is $5.2B, about 21% of the total and entirely unrelated to AI. Roughly 71% is targeted for delivery within twelve months, which makes this a far shorter book than the hyperscaler numbers. | ||||
Vertiv VRT | $15B | — | Filed Stale | Estimated combined order backlog |
Year on year +108.3%. The oldest figure on this page, and deliberately so. Vertiv has stopped disclosing backlog quarterly: the Q1 and Q2 2026 press releases, presentations and 10-Qs contain no backlog figure, with the word appearing only in risk-factor boilerplate. Coverage that attaches $15B to Vertiv's July 2026 quarter is recycling the December 2025 annual number. | ||||
Powell Industries POWL | $2.4B | +33.3% | Stated | Backlog |
Year on year +71.4%. Up 69% year over year and 35% sequentially, but data centers sit inside a commercial and other industrial line that was about 24% of quarterly revenue, with oil and gas, electric utility and petrochemical making up the rest. Quarterly new orders of $934M is a flow and should not be added to backlog. | ||||
Bloom Energy BE | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
Bloom reports no order backlog. The unsatisfied performance obligations of $442.4M on product and installation plus $51.7M of deferred service contracts sit inside the deferred revenue note and are not a comprehensive backlog. Presenting roughly $494M as Bloom's backlog against its data-center pipeline would mislead. | ||||
Cummins CMI | Not disclosedPower Systems revenue $2.3B, up 19% | — | None | Not disclosed |
Cummins discloses no backlog and explains why: much of its business runs through open purchase orders that can be cancelled on reasonable notice without charge, so it does not consider them firm. There is no remaining performance obligation disclosure either. The closest thing to forward visibility it offers is a sentence in the annual report saying demand for its data center products extends out six to eight quarters, which is qualitative and belongs to that filing rather than to the latest quarter. | ||||
Schneider Electric SBGSY | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
H1 2026Reported Jul 30, 2026No filing Schneider uses qualitative record backlog language and publishes orders growth rather than a backlog figure, consistent with long-standing practice. Flagged as not independently verified against the primary document, because the company's investor site blocks automated retrieval. | ||||
Who actually builds the sites
Engineering and construction contractors. This group needs the most care of any on the page, because most of them publish two different backlog numbers and the headline one is usually the larger, looser figure.
| Company | Backlog / RPO | QoQ | Basis | What the number counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Quanta Services PWR | $53BGAAP RPO $34B12-month backlog $32.3B | +10.3% | Non-GAAP | Total backlog (non-GAAP) |
Year on year +49.1%. The clearest example on this page of why the basis column exists. The record $53.4B everyone quotes is a non-GAAP figure including estimated master service agreement work; the GAAP obligation is $33.6B. Quanta publishes no data-center breakout at all, describing them only inside a qualitative large load centers category. The Electric segment is 82% of backlog and is overwhelmingly utility transmission and distribution. Part of the jump from $44.0B at the end of 2025 was acquisitions. | ||||
MasTec MTZ | $21BGAAP RPO $16B | +5.2% | Non-GAAP | Estimated 18-month backlog |
Year on year +30.0%. Capped at 18 months, so it is not comparable to the total-backlog figures above and below it, and it excludes roughly $3.2B sitting beyond that window. About 40% is master service agreement work where customers carry no minimum purchase obligation and can cancel at short notice. The data-center angle is mostly still to come: the Superior Group acquisition, which MasTec calls a leader in building data center infrastructure, closed in July 2026 and so contributes nothing to this figure. | ||||
EMCOR Group EME | $17B | +9.8% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations |
Year on year +43.9%. The most conservative definition in this group: EMCOR publishes GAAP remaining performance obligations and nothing looser alongside it, which is why its figure looks smaller than Quanta's despite a comparable business. No end-market breakout of the obligation exists. Management attributes the largest part of the increase to several data center construction contracts but also credits healthcare, water and education awards, so any data-center share of this number is unpublished. | ||||
Comfort Systems USA FIX | $14B | +12.9% | Stated | Backlog |
Year on year +73.2%. Company-wide with no AI carve-out, but unlike the other names in this group the mix has already tipped: technology customers were 58.7% of Q2 revenue, up from 43.0% a year earlier. Technology bundles data centers together with chip fabrication plants, so it is not purely AI. Same-store backlog is $13.70B, isolating about $360M of acquired backlog. | ||||
Primoris Services PRIM | $14BGAAP RPO $6.0BNext 12 months $6.1B | +19.0% | Non-GAAP | Total backlog (non-GAAP) |
Year on year +20.5%. The widest GAAP gap in the group: a record $13.9B headline against $6.0B of remaining performance obligations. Fully 59% is master service agreement backlog estimated from historical trends with no customer purchase commitment behind it. The only dollar figure in the filing tied to the data-center thesis is the $432.2M of fixed backlog contributed by the PayneCrest Electric acquisition, and even that is not purely data-center work. | ||||
IES Holdings IESC | $4.5BGAAP RPO $2.8B | — | Non-GAAP | Backlog (company definition) |
Backlog is up 91% since September 2025, almost entirely on data center electrical work. The company says so directly: the non-GAAP backlog includes signed agreements and letters of intent IES has no legal right to enforce before work starts. GAAP remaining performance obligations are $2.8B, and that $1.7B gap is the loose part of the headline. | ||||
Sterling Infrastructure STRL | $4.3BGAAP RPO $4.2BE-Infrastructure RPO $3.21B | +13.9% | Non-GAAP | Backlog |
Year on year +115.4%. The cleanest data-center read in this group, though still not pure. E-Infrastructure accounts for $3.21B of $4.23B of obligations, and Sterling says mission-critical projects including data centers, manufacturing and semiconductor plants are 92% of E-Infrastructure backlog, roughly $2.95B, without isolating data centers. Two cautions: the 116% headline growth is only about half organic, the rest from acquisitions, and Sterling's own series breaks this quarter because a $100M master service agreement component entered a metric that had been pure RPO until now. | ||||
MYR Group MYRG | $3.2BGAAP RPO $2.8B | — | Non-GAAP | Backlog (company definition) |
A record, split $1.27B transmission and distribution and $1.89B commercial and industrial, with new data center wins in New Jersey, Arizona and Colorado. The 10-Q's GAAP remaining performance obligations figure is $2.83B; the backlog definition adds awarded work the RPO standard excludes. | ||||
Argan AGX | $2.8B | -3.4% | Non-GAAP Stale | Consolidated project backlog |
Year on year +47.4%. On a January fiscal year, so this is the stalest figure in the group by more than three months, and the next report has not landed. The backlog is substantially gas-fired and renewable power plant construction, with named projects running from 700 MW to 1.4 GW, and Argan does not say which if any are contracted to serve data centers. The only explicitly data-center-linked work sits inside the $225.5M Industrial segment, an award for roughly 2,000 pressure vessels for thermal storage and chilled-water cooling. Treat Argan as a derived power-demand play rather than a data-center contractor. | ||||
Who ships the boxes and the fibre
Servers, optics and networking. By far the thinnest disclosure on the page: most of these companies publish no backlog at all, and among those that do, the headline figure has usually never appeared in a filing.
| Company | Backlog / RPO | QoQ | Basis | What the number counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Broadcom AVGO | $73B | — | Spoken | AI backlog stated for the next 18 months |
Stated on the December 2025 call alongside a $162B consolidated backlog, and not restated since. On the June 2026 call management gave flows instead: over $30B of AI semiconductor bookings in the quarter against $10.8B shipped, with demand visibility running to 2028. The word backlog does not appear once in the May 2026 10-Q, so like Dell's figure this exists only as spoken guidance. The September 2026 call is the likely refresh. | ||||
Sandisk SNDK | $60B | +43.7% | Filed | Remaining performance obligations (long-term supply agreements) |
The largest audited backlog in this hardware group, and it barely existed six months ago. Sandisk signed five multi-year NAND supply agreements (its New Business Models) with hyperscale-tier customers during fiscal 2026, and the 10-K puts the transaction price allocated to remaining performance obligations at $59.8 billion, up from $41.6 billion at the April quarter. This is a financial-statement figure under ASC 606, the same standard as the neocloud RPO rows, which makes it more comparable across this table than most storage-sector claims. The contracts carry minimum volume commitments and third-party financial guarantees. | ||||
Dell Technologies DELL | $51B | +19.3% | Spoken | AI backlog |
The single largest figure on this page that appears in no filing. The 10-Q says only that backlog increased significantly; the $51.3B comes from the chief operating officer on the earnings call, corroborated by the chief financial officer. Dell publishes no total-company backlog. Its next quarter is due in late August, so this number is already three months old. | ||||
Arista Networks ANET | $8.4BBinding product commitments $875M | +9.1% | Filed | Revenue from total remaining performance obligations |
Year on year +78.7%. Arista uses the word backlog nowhere in its filings. This is a genuine GAAP obligation but it is not an order book: $6.87B of it is deferred revenue from multi-year support contracts and product deferrals with acceptance clauses, and only $875.1M represents binding agreements for future product shipments. Separately, Arista discloses $9.7B of non-cancellable purchase commitments. That is an obligation to its own contract manufacturers, a supply-side number, and quoting it as customer demand would invert its meaning. | ||||
Ciena CIEN | $7.7BGAAP RPO $2.5BAbout $6.4B hardware, roughly 80% due within 12 months | — | Spoken | Backlog, management-defined, stated on the earnings call |
The sharpest example on this page of one company reporting two backlogs that differ by three times. The $7.7B was given by the finance chief on the June 4 call and appears in no filing; the 10-Q says only that conditions produced historically high backlog and puts the GAAP obligation at $2.5B, counting non-cancelable orders alone. Ciena does file a backlog figure annually in the 10-K, $5.0B at the November 2025 year end against $2.1B a year earlier. No AI carve-out exists, but both of its 10%-plus customers last quarter were cloud providers, together about 34% of revenue. Its next quarter had not been reported as of mid-August. | ||||
Hewlett Packard Enterprise HPE | $6.3B | — | Stated | AI backlog (AI Systems plus Networks for AI) |
HPE publishes two AI backlog figures on adjacent slides and they are easy to mix up. AI Systems backlog is $5.9B; adding Networks for AI takes it above $6.3B. Neither appears in the 8-K or the 10-Q. HPE reports no total-company backlog, and its next quarter is due in early September. | ||||
AMD AMD | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
Like Nvidia, AMD publishes no backlog line at all, and the absence is the finding. The OpenAI agreement covers up to 6 GW of Instinct GPUs across generations, paired with a warrant for up to 160 million AMD shares vesting on purchase milestones, and AMD frames the opportunity as tens of billions of dollars of revenue. None of that is booked backlog, and no RPO exists to check it against. | ||||
Applied Optoelectronics AAOI | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
Neither the Q1 nor the Q2 2026 release contains the word backlog. The $324M order backlog circulating on blogs and social platforms is an outside aggregation, not a company disclosure, and should not be cited as one. What is real: a multi-year supply agreement with Microsoft, an Amazon warrant covering up to 8 million shares tied to up to $4B of discretionary purchases, which is an incentive and not an order, and 800G transceiver capacity of nearly 100,000 units a month exiting Q1. | ||||
Coherent COHR | Not disclosedDatacenter and communications revenue $1.62B in FQ4 | — | None | Not disclosed |
No order backlog metric exists. Watch for a false positive here: the word backlog does appear in Coherent's filings, but only as an acquired intangible asset from the II-VI merger, fully amortized with zero net book value. Management said on the August 12 call that fiscal 2027 is essentially booked out with orders extending into calendar 2028, without attaching a figure, so that is commentary rather than a metric. The useful disclosure is the segment split: datacenter and communications was 79% of quarterly revenue, though it bundles telecom in with AI datacom. | ||||
Corning GLW | Not disclosedOptical communications revenue $2.07B, up 32% | — | None | Not disclosed |
Neither backlog nor remaining performance obligations appears anywhere in Corning's quarterly or annual report. The closest substitute is $2.7B of contract liabilities, which is genuinely demand-linked rather than ordinary deferred revenue: it includes customer deposits securing product rights under supply agreements running as long as ten years, among them a $1.0B upfront deposit taken in the second quarter under an agreement running through 2029. Call it a customer prepayment balance, not a backlog. Corning cites multiyear agreements with Amazon and Nvidia as demand support but quantifies neither. | ||||
Lumentum LITE | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
Lumentum's annual report carries a section headed Backlog whose entire content is an explanation of why backlog is not indicative of its business, citing schedule changes, cancellations and vendor-managed inventory. Its accounting policy defines remaining performance obligations but never states a dollar amount, and contract liabilities are negligible. There is also no longer a cloud or datacom carve-out, because Lumentum collapsed its segments into one reportable segment during fiscal 2026. Quarterly revenue more than doubled year over year, so the absence of a backlog figure is a disclosure choice rather than a sign of weak demand. | ||||
Marvell Technology MRVL | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
The other custom AI silicon house next to Broadcom discloses no backlog or RPO in any document. Management points to record bookings and guided fiscal 2027 revenue to about $11B, up about 30%, but has never attached a dollar figure to the order book. Analyst references to a Marvell AI backlog are constructions from that bookings commentary, not disclosures. | ||||
Micron Technology MU | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
No dollar backlog exists anywhere in the filings. What management has said is that HBM output is sold out through calendar 2026 under firm multi-year agreements, customers are queuing for 2027 supply, and contract lengths have stretched to three to five years. That is among the strongest demand signals in this table, but it lives in call commentary with no number attached, and one should not be constructed. | ||||
Seagate Technology STX | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
No dollar backlog appears in the filings. On the July 28 call, CEO Dave Mosley said nearline capacity is fully booked through calendar 2026, orders for the first half of 2027 open in the coming months, long-term agreements with major cloud customers give visibility through 2027, and 2028 discussions are already under way. Same shape as the Micron row: among the strongest demand signals on this page, but it lives in call commentary with no number attached, and one should not be constructed. | ||||
Super Micro Computer SMCI | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
Super Micro says it booked record backlog entering fiscal 2027 but attaches no number to it, and discloses no RPO. The $60B widely quoted as a backlog is new orders, a flow. Its own two filings describe different periods for that flow: the July 22 preliminary update says the orders were received during the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026, while the August 11 release quotes the chief executive saying they were generated in the past year. Either way it is orders received, not work outstanding, and the two are not interchangeable. | ||||
Western Digital WDC | Not disclosed | — | None | Not disclosed |
No dollar backlog exists in the filings. On the August 5 call, management said the company is essentially sold out for calendar 2026 on firm purchase orders from its top seven customers, with long-term agreements in place with two of them for calendar 2027 and one reaching into 2028, and customers seeking terms out to 2029-2031. Like Seagate and Micron, the demand signal is loud but no figure is disclosed, so this stays a none row. | ||||
Who makes the chipmaking machines
Semiconductor capital equipment sits one step upstream of every AI chip. The three numbers here are measured nothing alike: ASML discloses backlog once a year and stopped publishing quarterly bookings in 2026, KLA's figure was spoken on a call and folds in long service contracts, and Applied Materials excludes anything shorter than a year, which keeps its figure structurally tiny. Rank inside this group with extreme care.
| Company | Backlog / RPO | QoQ | Basis | What the number counts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ASML ASML | $45B | — | Stated | Order backlog (bookings not yet recognized) |
Stated as 38.8 billion euros, converted per the fx note, with orders scheduled out through 2027. This figure now refreshes only once a year: ASML stopped publishing quarterly bookings with Q1 2026, arguing that lumpy orders distort the read on momentum, so the backlog stays dated until the January 2027 annual release unless management volunteers an update. Q4 2025 net bookings were 13.2 billion euros, nearly double consensus. | ||||
KLA KLAC | $13B | — | Spoken | Remaining performance obligations, stated on the earnings call |
About $12.5B, stated on the July 2026 call for the June quarter. KLA's RPO is a broad number that folds in multi-year service contracts alongside systems orders, so it is not a pure tools order book. The press release does not carry the figure, and we could not locate it as a headline number in the FY2026 10-K text either, which is why this row wears the call badge. | ||||
Applied Materials AMAT | $1.2B | — | Filed | Remaining performance obligations, contracts of one year or more |
Structurally tiny by design, not by weakness: the disclosure excludes every contract with an original duration under one year, and a tools business runs on short-cycle purchase orders. It measures a sliver of real demand and should never be ranked against ASML or KLA as if the three were alike. The Q3 FY2026 10-Q, due mid-August, refreshes it. | ||||
What the blanks tell you
Four of the most heavily discussed names in the AI trade publish no backlog figure at all, and one has quietly stopped. Meta discloses nothing in either its quarterly or annual report, which is a policy rather than an oversight, since its advertising revenue is short cycle. Super Micro says it holds record backlog without giving a number, and the $60B widely attached to it is a full year of new orders rather than work outstanding. Bloom Energy reports no order backlog, so the roughly $494M sitting in its deferred revenue note should not be dressed up as one. Vertiv is the one that changed: it disclosed $15.0B for the end of 2025 and has published no backlog figure in any quarterly filing since, meaning coverage that ties that number to its summer 2026 results is recycling a December figure.
The optics and networking names are the quietest group of all. Coherent, Lumentum and Corning publish no backlog whatsoever, despite demand that has roughly doubled revenue at some of them, and Lumentum's annual report contains a section headed Backlog whose entire purpose is to explain why it refuses to give one. Coherent's filings do contain the word, but only as a fully written-off intangible asset left over from a merger, which is the sort of false positive that ends up in a headline. Arista publishes no backlog either, though its remaining performance obligations are real enough.
How to read this without getting caught out
Dollar totals are not comparable across rows and are not meant to be ranked against each other outside their group. Amazon counts only contracts with original terms beyond a year. IBM excludes anything a customer can walk away from without penalty. Alphabet widened its own definition in early 2026, which is why its year-over-year column is blank rather than showing an impressive and meaningless number. Oracle's total is company-wide and includes $75B of prepaid or customer-supplied hardware. Among the smaller names, several headline figures assume every renewal option gets exercised, so Applied Digital appears here at its $36.2B base-term value rather than the $86B that assumes full renewal, and Galaxy at $30B including extensions against roughly $18B on the initial term alone.
The single easiest mistake to make with this data is mixing up a yearly rate with a lifetime total. Digital Realty's backlog is annualized rent, what the signed leases will pay each year once they switch on, so it is marked accordingly and kept in its own group. Setting $1.9B a year beside CoreWeave's $104.2B of lifetime contract value would understate the first by roughly the length of a lease. The same care applies to Nebius, whose $3.0B run-rate revenue is a yearly pace while its $37.5B obligation is a lifetime figure.
The construction group carries a second figure wherever the company publishes one, because the headline and the accounts often disagree sharply. Quanta's record $53.4B backlog sits against $33.6B of remaining performance obligations, and Primoris reports $13.9B against $6.0B. The difference is mostly estimated work under master service agreements, which customers are under no obligation to actually order. EMCOR is the exception that proves the point: it publishes only the GAAP figure, which is why its total looks modest next to peers running comparable businesses.
Megawatt figures need the same care. Cipher reports gross HPC capacity while Applied Digital, TeraWulf and Galaxy report critical IT load, which is a different denominator, so the power column is there for context within a row and not for ranking across them.
One row deserves a specific warning. IREN's $710M looks negligible next to its peers, but IREN books remaining performance obligations only for tranches that have been delivered and accepted, and as of its last report there had been none, so its roughly $9.7B Microsoft agreement contributed nothing at all. It said on August 13, 2026 that the first Horizon deployment had been accepted, so expect that figure to move sharply when it next reports. Euro figures converted at the ECB euro reference rate of 1.1534 USD/EUR on 2026-08-13. Yen figures converted at 159.3 JPY/USD on 2026-08-15.
Methodology
This tracker collects every backlog or remaining performance obligation figure the companies in the AI buildout have disclosed, and refuses to add them together. The reason is that the numbers are not the same kind of number. Each row is labelled with the basis it was reported on, the document it came from and the date the company stated it, so a GAAP obligation is never stacked on top of a self-defined pipeline figure.
- In the financial statements. Disclosed inside a 10-Q or 10-K, subject to audit and to a defined accounting standard.
- Non-GAAP backlog in a filing. Published in the filing but calculated on the company's own definition, typically including estimated work under master service agreements that carries no customer purchase commitment. Usually much larger than the same company's GAAP figure.
- Company release or deck. Published by the company in a press release or investor presentation, but absent from the financial statements. No accounting standard governs how it is calculated.
- Earnings call only. Said aloud by management on an earnings call and never written into a filing or a release.
- Not disclosed. The company publishes no comparable figure. Listed so the gap is visible rather than filled in with an estimate.
Figures move only when a company reports, so this page updates through earnings season rather than live, and the stamp under the headline is the newest data on the board rather than the moment you loaded it. Nothing is estimated or modelled: a number appears here only once the company has published it, and every row links to where. There is no login and no paywall.
For the valuation side of the same question, our AI Bubble Index dashboard scores how much the market is already pricing in against what these backlogs actually commit anyone to.
Related coverage
- Quanta raised guidance and rose 17.3%, while Sterling reported nothing and rose 17.4%
- Super Micro's revenue landed at the low end of guidance and the stock rose 25% anyway
- Nebius reported Q2 into a Michael Burry short position
Questions people ask
What is an AI backlog?
It is the work a company has already signed but not yet delivered. Most large cloud providers report it as remaining performance obligations, an accounting figure covering revenue under contract that has not been recognised yet. Industrial suppliers report an order backlog instead, meaning firm orders received but not yet shipped. Both answer the same question, how much demand is locked in, but they are calculated under different rules.
Which company has the largest AI backlog?
Microsoft, at $678B of commercial remaining performance obligations as of June 30, 2026. Oracle is second at $638B as of May 31, 2026, followed by Alphabet at $519.5B and Amazon at about $496B. Among the AI specialists CoreWeave leads with $104.2B.
Does a large backlog mean revenue is about to arrive?
No, and the duration varies enormously. Oracle expects only about 12% of its remaining performance obligations to convert to revenue within twelve months, while Eaton targets roughly 71% of its order backlog for delivery inside a year. Two companies can report similar backlog and be describing commitments that pay out over completely different timeframes.
Why does Ciena report a $7.7B backlog and a $2.5B remaining performance obligation?
They count different things and only one is in a filing. The $7.7B is a management-defined backlog that Ciena's finance chief gave on its June 4, 2026 earnings call, and it appears in no SEC document. The $2.5B is the GAAP remaining performance obligation in the same quarter's 10-Q, which counts only non-cancelable purchase orders. Ciena does file a backlog figure once a year in its annual report, which stood at $5.0B at its November 2025 year end against $2.1B a year earlier.
Why is Nvidia not on this leaderboard?
Nvidia does not report a backlog or remaining performance obligations figure, so there is no disclosed number to rank. In practice the backlog on this page belongs largely to the companies buying Nvidia hardware, which makes it a measure of demand downstream of Nvidia rather than at it.
Why do some companies show no figure at all?
Because they genuinely publish none. Meta discloses no backlog or remaining performance obligations in either its quarterly or annual report. Super Micro says it holds record backlog without attaching a number, and the $60B being quoted is full-year new orders, which is a flow rather than a stock. Bloom Energy reports no order backlog. Those rows are kept visible so the absence is legible instead of being filled in with an estimate.
Why does Quanta report both a backlog and a remaining performance obligation, and why do they differ?
Because they are built on different rules. Quanta's $53.4B total backlog as of June 30, 2026 is a non-GAAP measure that includes estimated future work under master service agreements, which customers have no obligation to actually order. Its GAAP remaining performance obligations, covering only work customers are contractually committed to, were $33.6B on the same date. Primoris shows an even wider split, $13.9B against $6.0B. EMCOR avoids the issue by publishing only the GAAP figure.
Are these numbers comparable to each other?
Only within limits, which is why every row carries its own metric label. Amazon counts only contracts with original terms longer than a year. IBM excludes anything a customer can cancel without penalty. Alphabet changed its definition in early 2026 to include short-term contracts, breaking its own year-over-year comparison. Several smaller names publish a contracted-revenue total that appears in an investor deck but nowhere in their financial statements.
Use this data
Our figures are free to reuse in articles, newsletters, and research with attribution and a link back to this page. How every number is computed: methodology. Current table as a file: download CSV.
Suggested citation: AIStockWire, “AI infrastructure backlog tracker,” aistockwire.com/backlog. Questions about the data: [email protected].
Every figure here is taken from the company's own filing, release or presentation, linked in the final column, and nothing is estimated or interpolated. Where a company publishes two versions of the same metric both are noted. This is a record of what has been disclosed, not a forecast, and none of it is investment advice.